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Abstract— The threats malware pose to the people around the world are increasing rapidly. A software that sneaks to your computer 
system without your knowledge with a harmful intent to disrupt your computer operations. Due to the vast number of malware, it is 
impossible to handle malware by human engineers. Therefore, security researchers are taking great efforts to develop accurate and 
effective techniques to detect malware. This paper offers an overall view and detailed survey for malware detection methods like 
signature-based and heuristic-based. The Signature-based is largely used today by anti-virus software to detect malware. It is fast and 
capable to detect known malware. However, it is not effective in detecting zero-day malware and is easily defeated by malware that 
use obfuscation techniques. Likewise, a considerable amount of legitimate files that are incorrectly classified as malware (false 
positive) and long scanning time are the major limitations of heuristic-based. Alternatively, memory-based analysis is a promising 
technique that gives a comprehensive view of malware and it is expected to become more popular in malware detection. This paper 
mainly focuses on the following areas: (1) providing an overview of malware types and malware detection methods, (2) discussing 
current malware analysis techniques, their findings and limitations, (3) studying the malware obfuscation, attacking and anti-analysis 
techniques, and (4) exploring the structure of memory-based analysis in malware detection. The methods of malware detection are 
compared with each other according to their techniques, selected features, accuracy rates, and their advantages and disadvantages. 
This paper aims to help the readers to have a comprehensive view of malware detection and discuss the importance of memory-based 
analysis in malware detection.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The threat that malware (short for malicious software) 
cause to the computing world is growing rapidly. According 
to the AV-TEST institute, 48 million various malware 
samples were developed in the first quarter of 2017 [1].  
Due to the vast number of malware, it is impossible to 
handle malware by human engineers. Thus, security 
researchers use malware detection systems to detect 
malware. Detection systems includes two stages: analysis 
and detection. Anti-virus software commonly use signature-
based approach to detect malware. This approach is fast and 
capable to detect known malware with minimal false 
positive rate. However, signature-based fails to discover 
unknown malware and is easily defeated by malware that 
uses obfuscation techniques. On the other hand, behavior-
based is another approach that is used in malware detection 
where suspicious files are executed in a controlled 
environment, monitored, and marked as malicious if their 
behaviors match with known malware behavior. Behavior-
based is able to detect unknown malware and malware that 
use obfuscation techniques, but it is time consuming with 
considerable false positive rate [2].      
Alternatively, memory-based is another approach that is 
becoming more popular in malware detection lately due to 
the wealth of information found in the dumped memory that 
can be used in investigating malicious activities [3].  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, 
under material and method, we explain malware types, 
detection methods, analysis techniques, and an overview of 
related works, Section III discusses the future direction of 
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malware and the main sources of malware dataset. Finally, 
the conclusion of the survey. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
This section provides an overview of malware types, 
malware detection methods, and analysis techniques.  
A. Malware Types   
Malware is a software that is inserted into the system 
without user knowlege. It can harm the computer system by 
compromising computer functions, stealing data or evading 
access controls. The following list presents the common 
categories of malware: 
• Virus: A malicious software that duplicates itself by 
injecting its code into other programs. Virus can 
spread from one program to another and from one 
computer to another [4].  
• Worms: Are malicious programs that replicate 
themselves in a computer and destroy the files and 
data on it. Worms might also encrypt files or send 
junk emails. Unlike viruses, worms carry themselves 
in their own containers [5].  
• Trojan horse: While acting as a legitimate programs, 
Trojans perform unknown and unwanted activities [4]. 
Trojans allow attackers to gain access to the effective 
computer and extract user confidential information 
like password and banking details. 
• Spyware: Spyware is a software that continuously 
spies on the users activities. It is used to gather 
information about the users like webpages regularly 
visited and credit card number without their 
knowledge, then sends that information back to the 
attackers [6].      
• Rootkit: Rootkit is a collection of malicious software 
that is programmed to access a computer system and 
allow other types of malware to get into the system 
[7].  
• Ransomware: A harmful software that allows the 
hacker to lock the computer and restrict the victim 
access to the vital information. Ransomware encrypts 
the important data on the infected computer or 
network then asks for payment to lift the restriction 
[8]. 
• Adware:  Advertising-supported software is a type of 
malware that continuously brings advertisements to 
the computer. Usually adware is bundled with free 
downloaded software and applications like free 
playing games [9].  
• Botnet: A malware that remotely controls a group of 
devices like PCs, smart phones and internet of things 
devices are infected and controlled by a cybercriminal.  
Botnet is typically used for spam emails campaigns or 
denial of service attacks.  Users are often unaware that 
their systems are infected by a botnet malware [10].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Methods of Malware detection  
 
B. Malware Detection Methods   
Malware detection methods are categorized in several 
ways from different point of view. In this section, we discuss 
the main methods of malware detection: Signature-based and 
heuristic-based. Figure 1, shows the main malware detection 
methods. 
1)  Signature-Based Detection  
Majority of available antivirus software use signature-
based approach. This approach extracts unique signature 
from captured malware file and use this signature to detect 
similar malware. A signature is a sequence of bytes or a file 
hash that can be used to identify specific malware [11]. 
Therefore, this method has small false positive (FP) rate 
[14].. However, it is not difficult for attackers to change 
malware signature to evade being detected by antivirus 
software. Signature-based is very effective and fast in 
detecting known malware, but it is incapable to capture new 
released malware [13]. Signature-based approach depends 
on implementing static analysis to extract exceptional byte 
sequences known as marks [12]Figure 2 shows the 
signature-based general procedure for malware detection.    
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  Signature-based general flow 
 
Malware authors have created another challenge for 
signature-based approach by using obfuscation techniques. 
This techniques include dead code insertion, register 
reassignment, instruction substitution, and code 
manipulation [15]. In the following we briefly explain each 
technique. 
• Dead-Code insertion:   This simple code obfuscation 
technique adds some NOP (No operation Performed) 
instructions or inserts ineffective PUSH/ POP 
statements to a program to change its look, but keep 
its same behavior. 
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• Register Reassignment: This technique works by 
switching registers or by reassigning the value of one 
register to unused one. For example, EAX is 
reassigned to EBX register.  
• Subroutine Reordering: Subroutine is a group of 
program operations that do a specific task. This 
technique changes the subroutines order randomly in 
the program.    
• Instruction Substitution: In this technique, original 
instructions that perform the same function are 
replaced by equivalent ones, such as replacing MOV 
instruction with PUSH instruction. 
• Code Integration: A malware that embedded itself to 
another legal program. It was first found in Zmist 
malware. To apply this technique, malware 
decompiles its targeted program and adds itself in 
between its source code [16]. Code integration is 
considered as one of the most sophisticated 
obfuscation techniques that allows malware to evade 
detection.       
2)  Heuristic-Based Detection  
Heuristic-based is also known as anomaly or behavior-
based detection. In this detection, the activities performed by 
malware during runtime are analyzed in a training (learning) 
phase. After that, the file is labelled as malicious or 
legitimate file during a testing (monitoring) phase based on a 
pattern extracted during the training test [11]. 
Unlike signature-based, behavior-based approach is 
capable to detect both unknown malware and malware that 
uses obfuscation techniques. However, the major drawbacks 
of behavior-based are a considerable false positive rate (FP) 
and excessive monitoring time [14]. Further, the reduction of 
thousands of extracted features, evaluate similarities 
between them, and monitoring malware activities are 
directly effecting the ability of detecting zero-day malware 
attacks [17], [18].      
Heuristic-based commonly depends on data mining 
techniques in order to understand the behaviors of running 
files, such techniques include Support Vector Machine, 
Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and Random Forest.  
C. Malware Analysis Techniques 
Malware analysis concerns studying malicious files with 
the aim of having better understanding about several aspects 
of malware like malware behavior, evolution over time, and 
their selected targets [19]. The outcome of malware analysis 
should allow security firms to strengthen their defence 
strategies against malware attacks.   
Techniques used for malware analysis mainly categorized 
into three parts: Static, Dynamic, and Hybrid analysis. In 
addition, memory-based analysis is another technique that is 
very useful in malware analysis. Figure 3, shows malware 
analysis techniques and their common features.   
 
Fig. 3 Malware analysis techniques and features 
1)  Static Analysis  
This technique refers to analyzing the Portable Executable 
files (PE files) without running them. Malware commonly 
uses binary packer, such as UPX and ASP Pack Shell, to 
avoid being analyzed [6]. A PE file needs to be unpacked 
and decompressed before being analyzed. To decompile 
windows executable file a disassembler tool can be used, 
such as IDA Pro and OlleyDbg that display assembly 
instructions, provide information about the malware, and 
extract pattern to identify the attacker.    
The detection pattern can be extracted in static analysis 
like Windows API calls, string signature, control flow graph 
(CFG), opcode (operation codes) frequency and byte 
sequence n-grams [20]. In the following, we explain the 
main features in static analysis. 
Almost all programs use Windows API (short for 
Application Programming Interface) calls to communicate 
with the operating system. For example, the "OpenFileW" is 
a Windows API in "Kernel32.dll" that creates a new file or 
opens an existing one. Therefore, API calls reveal the 
behavior of programs and could be considered as an 
essential mark in malware detection. For instance, the 
Windows API calls "WriteProcessMemory", "LoadLibrary" 
and "CreateRemoteThread" are a suspected behavior used by 
malware for DLL injection into a process, while rarely come 
together in a legitimate set.  DLL injection is discussed in 
memory analysis section. 
Strings are good indicator of malicious existence. Strings 
reveal the attacker's intent and goals since they often hold 
critical semantic information [6]. For example, the following 
string “This program cannot be run in DOS mode” indicates 
malicious file when it is found outside of the typical PE 
header, which is a common feature of droppers and 
installers. 
Control Flow Graph (CFG): A CFG is a directed graph 
that demonstrates the control flow of a program, where 
blocks of code are presented by nodes and control flow paths 
by edges. In malware detection, CFG can be used to capture 
the behavior of a PE file and extract the program structure 
[19].         
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Opcodes is the first part of a machine code instruction 
(also called machine language) that identifies what operation 
to be executed by the CPU. A full machine language 
instruction composed of opcode and, optionally, one or more 
operands (e.g., "mov eax 7", "add eax ecx" and "sub ebx 1"). 
Opcode can be employed as a feature in malware detection 
by testing opcode frequency or calculating the similarity 
between opcode sequences.     
N-grams are all of contiguous subsequences of a sequence 
of a length N [21]. For example, the word "MALWARE" is 
a sequence of letters of length 7, it can be segmented into 3-
grams as: "MAL", "ALW", "LWA", "WAR" and "ARE". N-
Grams have been applied with various detection features like 
API calls and opcodes.  
Beside the previous features, there are other features that 
have been used in static analysis like file size and function 
length. Networking features like TCP/ UDP ports, 
destination IP and HTTP request are also features in static 
analysis [19].  
One of the most significant research on malware signature 
evasion techniques has been done by Kirat and Vigna [22]. 
They were able to extract techniques from 2810 malware 
samples and group them into 78 similar evasion signature 
techniques.  
Hashemi and Hamzeh presented a new approach that 
extracts unique opcode from the executable file and converts 
them into digital image. Visual features are then extracted 
from the image using Local Binary Pattern (LBP), which is 
one of the most famous texture extraction method in image 
processing. Finally, machine-learning methods are used to 
detect malware. The proposed detection technique obtained 
accuracy rate of 91.9% [23]. Shaid and Maarof also 
suggested displaying malware in the form of images. Their 
technique captures API calls of malware and converts them 
into visual cues or images. These images are used to identify 
malware variants [24].  
On the other hand, both Salehi et al. [25] and Han et al. 
[26] built their techniques based on extracted API calls. 
Salehi et al. extracted API calls from each binary files and 
used API frequencies to learn the classifier. Then, three 
feature sets were generated ‘API calls list’, 'API arguments' 
and ‘API and arguments list’, and each set has been tested 
separately. Results showed that API arguments list is better 
compared to the other two sets with accuracy of 98.4% and 
false positive rate around 3%. In the same way, Han et al. 
extracted APIs from the IAT table (import Address Table) 
using static analysis. They compared the extracted API 
sequence with another sequence and calculated the similarity 
between them to classify malware family. Han found that 
malware within the same family are about 40% similar and 
false positive rate calculated 16%. Likewise, Cheng et al. 
[27] analyzed native APIs sequences using WinDbg tool and 
applied Support Vector Machine to detect shellcode 
malware. They used a too small training set, and were able 
to achieve 94.37% accuracy rate. However, false negative 
rate accounted as high as 44.44%. 
Table I, shows the results of surveyed papers that applied 
static analysis in their malware detection approaches. 
 
 
TABLE I 
SURVEYED PAPERS THAT APPLY STATIC ANALYSIS 
Author 
Year 
Static 
feature Classifier 
Dataset 
Malware/ 
Benign 
Acc FP 
Hashemi  
2018 [23] Opcode KNN 
M=3,100 
B=3,100 91.9% - 
Salehi  
2014 [25] 
API, 
arguments 
ROT-F, RF, 
DT, J48, 
NB 
M=826 
B=395 98.4% 3% 
Han 
2012 [26] 
APIs 
sequence - M=545 40%
*
 16% 
Santos 
2013 [28] 
Opcode 
sequence 
DT, KNN, 
BN, SVM 
M=1,000 
B=1,000 97.5% 6% 
Cheng 
2017 [27] 
Native APIs 
sequence SVM 
M=18/ 
B=72 94.4% 1.4% 
* Similarity within the same family 
 
2)  Dynamic Analysis 
It is also called behavior analysis. In this analysis, 
suspicious files are executed and monitored in a controlled 
environment like VM, emulator or simulator [9]. The 
infected files need to be analyzed in invisible environment 
for simple reason that some malware are supported with 
anti-virtual machine and anti-emulator techniques. Malware 
behave normally when they detect such environment and do 
not show any malicious activity. 
Compared to static analysis, dynamic analysis is more 
effective as there is no need to disassemble the infected file 
to analyze it. In addition, dynamic analysis is able to detect 
known and unknown malware. Furthermore, obfuscated and 
polymorphic malware cannot evade dynamic detection. 
However, dynamic analysis is time intensive and resource 
consuming [6]. 
TABLE II 
SURVEYED PAPERS THAT APPLY DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
Author 
Year 
Dynamic 
feature Classifier 
Dataset 
Malware/ 
Benign 
Acc FP 
Liang 
2016 [32] API calls 
DT, ANN, 
SVM M=12,199 91.3% - 
Mohaisen 
2013 [29]  
file system, 
registry, 
network 
SVM, DT, 
KNN M=1,980 95% 5% 
Mohaisen 
2015 [30] 
file system, 
registry, 
network  
SVM, DT, 
KNN M=115,000 99% - 
Galal 
2017 [33] 
APIs 
sequence 
DT, RF, 
SVM 
M=2,000/ 
B=2,000 97.2% - 
Ki 
2015 [34] 
APIs 
sequence - M=23,080 99.8% 0% 
Fan 
2015 [35] 
User API, 
native API 
J48, NB, 
SVM 
M=773/ 
B=253 95.9% 5% 
 
Various techniques can be used with dynamic analysis, 
such as function call monitoring, function parameter 
analysis, instruction traces, and information flow tracking 
[20]. Reviewing the surveyed papers, API and system calls 
are largely employed in malware dynamic analysis as well as 
file system, Windows registry and network features.  
Mohaisen et al. tried to classify Zeus malware using 
several machine learning techniques. Artifacts like registry, 
file system, and network features were used to learn the 
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classifier [29]. The dataset consisted of 1980 samples of 
Zeus Banking Trojan and accuracy achieved close to 95%. 
Afterward, in the next work, Mohaisen et al. proposed  
AMAL, an automated and behavior-based malware analysis 
and labeling system. AMAL consists of two components: 
AutoMal and AutoLabel.  Automal uses file system, network 
activity logging, and registry monitoring features to analyze 
malware samples. Further, AutoLabel classifies malware 
samples into their families based on their behavior. AMAL 
used more than 115,000 malware samples and achieved 
detection rate around 99% [30].    
In their work [31], Chen and Bridges studied WannaCry 
Ransomware features from system logs, which is produced 
using Cuckoo Sandbox. TF-IDF approach, shorts for term 
frequency–inverse document frequency, has been used to 
calculate frequent terms with high weights in the system 
logs.   
Most of the dynamic techniques focused on API calls to 
represent malware behaviors (e.g. [32], [33], [34]–[35]). 
Liang et al. [32] introduced a behavior-based malware 
variant classification technique that captures API calls of 
running malware, then creates multilayer dependency chain 
based on the dependency relationship of the API calls. The 
technique is able to measure the degree of similarity between 
malware variants. Galal et al. also applied API hook to 
capture information about API calls and their parameters. 
Then, related API calls that share common semantic 
purposes are set together into sequences. Their highest 
accuracy was 97.19% achieved using Decision Tree [33]. 
Likewise, Ki et al. [34] proposed an approach that extracts 
user level API call sequences by using, Microsoft supported 
tool, Detours and apply Multiple Sequence Alignment 
algorithm (MSA), which is one of the most popular 
algorithms used in DNA sequence alignment. After that, Ki 
et al. applied Longest Common Subsequence algorithm 
(LCS) to match similar sequences. The approach achieved 
99.8% accuracy and zero (0) false positive. Further, Fan et 
al. [35] used API hooking to trace APIs that malware try to 
hide. The technique monitors both regular APIs and native 
APIs like undocumented and low-level APIs. In the 
experiment, only 80 APIs were selected and detection rate 
reached 95% using Decision Tree and Naive Bayesian 
algorithms. 
Table II, shows the results of surveyed papers that applied 
dynamic analysis in their malware detection approaches. 
In dynamic analysis, malware are executed in a controlled 
environment to examine the live behavior of malicious files 
without being harmed by them. There are several types of 
control environment like emulators, debuggers, simulators 
and virtual machines. Next, we present each type and 
explain the strategies malware use in order to detect the 
existence of controlled environment.  
Emulator is a controlled environment that is used to 
control the execution of a malicious program. A full 
emulation system controls the CPU, hard disk and resources. 
Emulators are distinguished based on the controlled part of 
the running environment. TEMU, which is part of BitBlaze 
project, introduced in 2008 by Sont et al. [36] as a full 
emulation system that supports dynamic binary analysis by 
monitoring features like network activities, memory 
locations, function calls, processes, modules and API calls. 
TTAnaylze [37] is another type of emulators that works on 
QEMU, which is an open source machine emulator, and 
provides automatic malware analysis module that records 
windows APIs  and native APIs. However, majority of 
malware are able to detect emulated environment. In case of 
partial emulation system, malware can perform operation 
that works outside the emulated environment to detect 
whether it is running inside a controlled environment. 
Further, malware can still detect the characteristics and side 
effects of full environment system like detecting imperfect 
CPU features and comparing system properties (i.e. 
currently logged-in user) [38].  
Debugger is another type of controlled environment, 
which is a program that observes and examines the 
execution of other binary programs. WinDbg, OllyDbg and 
GDB are debuggers that can be used to monitor the 
execution behavior of suspected binaries at the instruction 
level. Unlike OllyDbg, WinDbg also supports kernel 
debugging. Further, IDA Pro is a static analysis tool that has 
less capable built-in debugger. Though, The use of Windows 
API is the most straightforward technique malware use to 
determine that it is being debugged. API functions that can 
be used for anti-debugging include “IsDebuggerPresent”, 
“CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent” and “OutputDebugString”. 
Another technique performed by malware is to look for signs 
of installing debugging tool on the system such as searching 
registry keys, files and directories. Further, malware can use 
several techniques like exceptions and interrupts to disrupt 
the execution of a program only if it is being debugged [40].  
Another environment is simulator, which is a program 
that simulates operation in order to be observed by user 
without actually performing that operation. Simulator tools 
such as CWSandbox, Norman sandbox and Detours allow 
malware to execute in a controlled virtual environment and 
record its behavior. Detours is used to intercept function 
calls made by a process to any DLL (DLL injection), while 
CWSandbox performs API hooking to capture Windows 
API calls invoked by a malware. On the other hand, Norman 
sandbox simulates Windows operating system, LAN and 
Internet connectivity on the host machine [38]. For anti-
simulation, Malware checks for registry, files or processes to 
determine the existence of certain sandbox product. The 
execution time is another technique to detect sandbox and 
virtual environment as executing instruction under controlled 
environment requires longer time than a real one [41]. 
The most common controlled environment is virtual 
machine (VM). VM is a computer software that runs an 
operating system and applications. These applications are 
isolated from the host system. Thus, running file or software 
inside a virtual machine cannot interfere with the host 
machine. Virtual machine applications include VirtualBox, 
Parallels and VMware. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is 
a software that creates, runs and manages virtual machine 
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[39]. Furthermore, it is also responsible for assigning 
hardware to virtual machine. However, Malware examines 
the existence of virtual machine (VM) on a system by 
searching for artifacts that installed VM tools leave in the 
file system, registry and process listing. Malware can also 
look for certain instructions that can be invoked by user 
mode such as “sidt”, “sgdt“, and “sldt“ to observe the 
presence of VM tools [40]. Furthermore, Hardware 
characteristics and features may lead to the presents of 
virtual machine. For example, CPUID hypervisor bit is set to 
zero in the real system and malware, therefore, can test this 
bit to determine if they are running inside a virtual machine. 
In addition, most debuggers and Virtual Machines create 
files and drivers that belong to that particular tool, malware 
can look for these artifacts to discover the presence of virtual 
machines or debuggers [41]. 
3)  Hybrid Analysis 
Hybrid analysis gather information about malware from 
static analysis and dynamic analysis. By using hybrid 
analysis, security researchers gain the benefits of both 
analyses, static and dynamic. Therefore, increasing the 
ability of detecting malicious programs correctly [42]. Both 
analyses have their own advantages and limitations. Static 
analysis is cheap, fast and safer compared to dynamic 
analysis. However, malware evade it by using obfuscation 
techniques. On the other hand, dynamic analysis is reliable 
and can beats obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, it is able 
to recognize malware variants and unknown malware 
families. However it is time intensive and resource 
consuming [6].  
Shijo and Salim [43] proposed an integrated technique to 
detect and classify unknown files. Printable strings 
information (PSI) feature was extracted by performing static 
analysis. Besides, using dynamic analysis to extract API 
calls. Experiment showed detection rate of 95.8% applying 
static, 97.1% applying dynamic and 98.7% for hybrid 
analysis. Their highest accuracy was achieved using SVM 
technique. Islam et al. [44] extracted two features from static 
analysis Function Length Frequency (FLF) and Printable 
String information (PSI) and API calls and parameters 
during dynamic analysis. Based on the results, Random 
Forest machine learning technique showed the highest result 
in classifying the data. In addition, they have found that 
applying the approach on old malware samples has better 
accuracy compared to new samples, with accuracy of 99.8% 
and 97.1% respectively. Further, Ma et al. [45] introduced a 
method to reduce false positive in malware classification 
called Ensemble that combined static and dynamic classifier 
into one classifier. The method uses multi features include 
static import functions and dynamic call functions to 
improve the accuracy and reduce false positive. 
Furthermore, Santos et al. [46] introduced OPEM, a tool to 
detect unknown malicious files by combining opcode 
frequency obtained during static analysis and system calls, 
operations and raised exceptions during dynamic analysis. 
OPEM showed accuracy of 95.9% from static analysis, 
77.26% using dynamic and 96.6% using hybrid analysis with 
SVM.  
Table III, shows the results of surveyed papers that applied 
hybrid analysis in their malware detection approaches. 
TABLE III 
SURVEYED PAPERS THAT APPLY HYBRID ANALYSIS 
Author 
Year 
Feature 
Static/ 
Dynamic 
Classifier 
Dataset 
Malware/ 
Benign 
Acc FP 
Shijo  
2016 [43] PSI/ API calls RF, SVM 
M=1,368 
B=456 98.7% - 
Islam 
2013 [44] 
Function 
length, PSI/ 
API 
DT, SVM, 
RF, IB1 M=2,939 97% 5.1% 
Ma  
2016 [45] 
Import 
functions/ call 
functions 
DT, NB, 
SVM M=279 - - 
Santos 
2013 [46] 
Opcode/ 
system calls, 
operations, and 
exceptions 
DT, KNN, 
NB, SVM 
M=13,189 
B=13,000 96.6% 3% 
 
4)  Memory Analysis 
Memory analysis has become a popular technique, in the 
recent years, proven to be efficient and accurate in malware 
analysis. Memory analysis attracts malware analysts as it 
gives comprehensive analysis of malware [47] since it is 
able to examine malware hooks and code outside the 
function normal scope [48]. It uses memory image to 
analyze information about running programs, operating 
system, and the general state of the computer.  
Memory forensics investigations pass through two steps: 
memory acquisition and memory analysis. In the memory 
acquisition, the memory of the target machine is dumped to 
obtain a memory image using tools such as Memoryze, 
FastDump and DumpIt. The memory analysis step is to 
analyze the memory image looking for malicious activities 
using tools like Volatility and Rekall. 
A number of researches related to memory forensics 
techniques have been proposed. Teller and Hayon [50] 
proposed a trigger-based memory analysis approach that 
triggers memory dumps based on the following events: API-
based, performance-based and instrumentation-based in 
order to know what happens during the execution of the 
malware file and not only at the end of it. Further, Choi et al. 
[51] introduced a modification to Teller and Hayon’s 
technique in [50]. By implementing API trigger-based 
memory dump technology for Cuckoo sandbox, which 
makes Cuckoo capable to dump the memory at every wanted 
API call.  
In their research, Mosli et al. [3] investigated three 
features extracted from memory images:  imported libraries, 
registry activity, and API function calls to detect malware. 
Their highest accuracy was about 96% using SVM with data 
from registry activity. Afterward, in the next research, Mosli 
et al. [52] proposed a technique that uses the process handles 
to detect whether the suspected sample is malicious or 
benign. The experiment have spotted the light on the main 
types of handles that malicious process commonly use, such 
1667
  
as section handles, process handles and mutants. On the 
other hands, Zaki and Humphrey [7] studied the memory 
artifacts left by rootkits in kernel-level such as: driver, 
module, SSDT hook, IDT hook and callback. The 
experiment has proven that callback functions, modified 
drivers, and attached devices are the most suspicious 
activities in the kernel-level. Table IV, shows the results of 
surveyed papers that applied memory analysis in their 
malware detection approaches. 
TABLE IV 
SURVEYED PAPERS THAT APPLY MEMORY ANALYSIS 
Author 
Year Feature Classifier 
Dataset 
Malware/ 
Benign 
Acc FP 
Mosli  
2016 [3] 
Registry, 
imported libraries, 
API calls 
SVM, 
SGD, DT, 
RF, KNN 
M=400 
B=100 96% - 
Mosli  
2017 [52] 
Number of 
opened handles 
KNN, 
SVM, RF 
M=3,130 
B=1,157 91.4% - 
Zaki 
2014 [7] 
Driver, module, 
hooks, callback  - - - - 
 
In addition, Memory forensic techniques are able to 
monitor malware behaviors like API hooking, DLL injection 
and Hidden processes [49]. In the following, we discuss each 
behavior and malware anti-forensics techniques.   
Windows API is generally used to communicate with 
system resources like files, processes, registry and network 
[53]. Malware use a technique called API hooking to 
interrupt the function calls. In other words, it can change the 
behavior and flow of API calls. Following is the most 
common types of API hooks [54] [55]: 
• IAT hooks: A PE file stores the address of API 
functions in the Import Address Table (IAT). Malware 
overwrites the location of API in the IAT, thus forcing 
the process to call an attacker function instead of the 
original API. Many well-known malware are using 
IAT hook like Zeus, FinFisher and Stuxnet.       
• Inline API hooks: Also called trampoline or detours 
hooks. Inline hooks require writing in few places in 
process's memory. For example, Malware adds jump 
instruction (JMP) into a legitimate function prologue 
to move the flow to a different memory location that is 
occupied by a rootkit.  
• IDT hook: The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) stores 
functions for handling interrupts and exceptions. 
Malware changes the value in 0x2E entry in the IDT 
and gain control when a call to a kernel mode API 
function is executed. 
• SSDT hooks: The System Service Descriptor Table 
(SSDT) is a table containing pointers to kernel mode 
functions. Malware uses SSDT to protect and hide 
themselves. For example, by hooking the SSDT 
malware can negate the call to "NTOpenProcess" and, 
therefore, no program will be able to kill the malicious 
process.  
• IRP hook: Applications in Windows communicate 
with drivers through Input/ Output Request Packet 
(IRP). Malware uses IRP hook to do malicious actions 
such as keylogging and disk access filtering.  
DLL injection is a technique aiming to insert a malicious 
code into a legitimate process.  Once the malicious DLL is 
injected, the execution flow is transferred to the malicious 
memory space [56]. The DLL injection can be categorized 
into the following main techniques: 
• Classic DLL injection using remote thread: DLL 
injection is a common technique malware use to inject 
malicious code into another process.  Malware write 
the Dynamic Link Library (DLL) path in the virtual 
address space of the target process, and creates remote 
thread in the target process to make sure that it loads 
the malicious DLL. The malware first calls the API 
"VirtualAllocEx" to assign memory into the address 
space of the victim, and then it calls 
"WriteProcessMemory" to write the DLL path into the 
allocated memory. After that, "LoadLibrary" is called 
for the DLL load. Finally, the malware calls function 
like "CreateRemoteThread", "NtCreateThreadEx" or 
"RtlCreateUserThread" to create the thread in the 
target process [57].       
• Injecting via registry modification:  Hackers modify 
the value of "Appinit_DLL" registry key that is 
located at 
"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVer
sion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls", to conduct DLL 
injection. Then, the location of the malware library is 
added to "Appinit_DLL" to make another process load 
their library. To apply this, malware calls 
"RegCreateKeyEx" to open the "Appinit_Dlls" 
registry key, and then calls "RegSetValueEx" to 
modify its values. Additional, rebooting the system is 
needed to apply the modifications in the registry 
values to the system [58].  
• Injection using window hooking function: In 
Windows application, program code is executed based 
on events. Malware can load their malicious DLL 
whenever certain event is triggered. The 
"SetWindowsHookEx" function is used to install a 
hook routine into the hook chain. Thus, the malicious 
action inputted into the "SetWindowsHookEx" 
function is called whenever a particular event is 
triggered such as mouse move or key press [56].  
The existence of hidden processes, files or network 
connections is a good indicator of a successful malicious 
attack [59]. Therefore, attackers try to hide their malicious 
artifacts. Hiding a process is typically accomplished by 
rootkit called stealth rootkit, which modifies program 
binaries. Another method is to hook the call path between 
applications and the kernel by modifying system call tables, 
dynamic link structures, libraries, or operating system 
functions [60]. Further, some rootkits modify the kernel data 
structures using direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) 
leading to incorrect user requests and, therefore, unrevealing 
the existence of malicious process [61].          
In order to prevent memory forensics or make it 
unworkable, malware use anti-forensic techniques. The 
following are some of anti-forensic techniques: 
• Memory hiding:  Malware tries to hide malicious 
memory region form memory analysis tools.  
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• Memory acquisition failure: By terminating certain 
processes or limiting driver loading to thwart memory 
acquisition process. 
• Anti-Carving: Malware attempts to prevent memory 
analysts from extracting kernel information by 
manipulating the kernel data structure field in order to 
make the memory analysis tools mislead the field [62]. 
• Increase timing: Malware creates fake objects in the 
kernel data structure to increase analysis time. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Future Direction 
Many security researchers believe that the future of 
malware still ambiguous. There are a number of challenges 
in the future of malware development in which, we believe, 
security firms and researchers should consider. First, one 
worry is the automation of creating malware variants. 
Studying the latest malware detection methods and using 
machine learning, attackers can develop automated tools that 
are able to produce thousands of different malware samples 
every day. Second, malware groups may offer those malware 
automation tools for rental or sale, giving the chance to low-
skilled groups and amateur hackers to enter malware world. 
Third, Malware are rapidly change in terms of structure and 
functionality. Most of the surveyed techniques used one 
malware dataset to learn and test the behaviors (the 
classifier). Although they have got a high detection rate, but 
results would be different when applying the techniques on a 
new released malware. Finally, malware are expected to 
become more complicated in the future. Attackers might use 
a new encryption methods or obfuscation techniques to make 
malware detection and analysis an impossible job. 
The traditional way anti-virus software use to capture 
malware is by searching for known signature. Unfortunately, 
this technique can easily be evaded by simple obfuscation 
technique [63]. Static and dynamic analyses have their 
limitations as well. Alternatively, memory analysis gives 
comprehensive analysis of malware. Malware can hide its 
code in the computer system effectively. However, malware 
must execute its code in the memory to perform its tasks 
eventually. Volatile memory (RAM) keeps its contents until 
it is powered off.  Therefore, analyzing the RAM can tell us 
about the activities which is happening in the system. 
Valuable live Information that resides in memory include 
running process, Dynamic Link Library (DLL), files, 
registry keys, services, sockets and ports, and active network 
connections [64]. Thus, memory analysis is a promising 
technique that is expected to become more popular, together 
with data mining and machine learning techniques, in 
malware detection.  
B. Dataset 
In order to study malware techniques and tricks, it is very 
important for researchers to collect malware samples. One 
way to collect samples is by using honeypots, which is a 
dedicated machine deployed to attract attackers to learn their 
attacking techniques [65]. Researchers can also use known 
malicious URLs. In addition, malware dataset can be 
downloaded from anti-malware agents' websites such as 
Malware DB, Malwr, MalShare, VX Heaven, theZoo and 
VirusShare malware repository. Furthermore, some 
specialized companies and research project groups 
occasionally share their collection of malware datasets. In 
2015, Microsoft provided 500 GB dataset of known malware 
files in the big challenge competition [66]. Recently, 
Endgame is sharing “ember” project with 600 thousands 
malicious files to address the lack of open-source datasets in 
the domain of static detection malware [67].   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Malware is causing a critical threat to our computer 
systems, internet and data. The challenges that malware 
authors pose by developing complicated malware that 
frequently changes their signature to evade detection, and by 
releasing more sophisticated versions of malware that use 
new obfuscation techniques,  have brought many issues to 
anti-virus software and security researchers. In this paper, 
we briefly surveyed malware types and malware detection 
methods. We have also reviewed three types of malware 
analysis techniques: static, dynamic and hybrid. We also 
gave a discussion on the use of memory forensics in finding 
malware artifacts. In addition, we discussed the future of 
memory-based analysis in malware detection. Techniques 
used by malware to evade detection such as obfuscation, 
attacking and anti-analysis techniques have been reviewed as 
well. Finally, the future direction of malware development 
and the main sources of malware dataset have been studied 
in this paper.   
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